Using pharmacy claims from New Hampshire between 2009 and 2011, I study the extent to which pharmacy competition a¤ects prescription payments. I measure pharmacy competition by the distance to nearby rivals, as well as a …xed-travel-time HHI (Dunn and Shapiro, 2014) . After controlling for various factors, including insurer, pharmacy, drug, and area characteristics, I …nd higher average drug prices in more concentrated seller (pharmacy) markets, but lower prices in more concentrated buyer (insurer) markets. The distance e¤ect is more pronounced if a nearby pharmacy belongs to the same national chain. In addition, I show heterogeneous distance e¤ects across different drug types and areas. My analysis contributes to the empirical literature on competition measures by adding new evidence from the retail pharmaceutical market.
Introduction
According to the IMS Institute for Healthcare Informatics, prescription drugs account for about one-…fth of total health care costs in the U.S., and are expected to continue to rise. 1 In recent years, public concern over high drug prices has been fueled by price scandals involving life-saving drugs-for example, Turing Pharmaceuticals'Daraprim in 2015 and Mylan's EpiPen in 2016.
'
3 However, when facing rising prices, unlike the case with other products, cheaper substitutes may not be available for medications. Both anecdotal evidence and academic research (Sorensen, 2001; Chen, 2015) highlight considerable price variations across pharmacies, and suggest that consumers should search for lower prices, even those with insurance coverage. 4 As high-deductible insurance plans become more common, the insured are required to pay out-of-pocket for prescriptions at insurers'negotiated rates before their deductible is satis…ed. Moreover, depending on coverage, insured patients'costs may di¤er between in-network and out-of-network pharmacies, whether one uses a preferred pharmacy, and, to a lesser extent-due to variations in coinsurance-pharmacies'costs to acquire prescription drugs from manufacturers or wholesalers. 5 2 Source: "This 62-year-old drug just got 5,000% more expensive," by Laura Lorenzetti, September 21, 2015 (http://fortune.com/2015/09/21/turing-pharmaceuticals-drug-prices-daraprim/). 3 Source: "Mylan's EpiPen Pricing Crossed Ethical Boundaries,"by Daniel Kozarich, September 27, 2016 (http://fortune.com/2016/09/27/mylan-epipen-heather-bresch/). 4 Studies show that insured patients may sometimes incur a lower cost without using insurance for prescription drugs.
Source: "Prescription Drugs May Cost More with Insurance Than without It," by Charles Ornstein and Katie Thomas, Dec.
9, 2017, New York Time (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/health/drug-prices-generics-insurance.html). 5 For an example of Mayo Medical Plan's 2018 prescription drug coverage, visit: http://www.mayo.edu/pmts/mc6200-mc6299/mc6213-11.pdf. based on actual market share (Kessler and McClellan, 2000; Gowrisankaran and Town, 2003) , while others use physician density, such as the number of physicians per capita (Bradford and Martin, 2000; Richardson et al., 2003) . More recent work has adopted a novel and objective measure: travel distance to competing providers (Dunn and Shapiro, 2014; Gravelle et al., 2016) , which alleviates the endogeneity concern that arises from the existing alternatives, by which unobserved factors may simultaneously determine market structure and provider pricing. However, similar studies of retail pharmacy markets are scarce, largely due to data unavailability.
This paper aims to …ll the gap. Unlike in other product markets, physicians, rather than consumers, determine the use of prescription drugs. Meanwhile, individual patients play no role in negotiating payments between pharmacies and insurers or pharmacy bene…t managers (PBMs). Furthermore, prescription drug prices have been rising at a faster rate than general in ‡ation for decades, triggering heated debate and high-pro…le congressional scrutiny of the pharmaceutical industry. 6 These unique features of the pharmaceutical market make it particularly interesting to study.
My identi…cation strategy is to use both the between-area and cross-time variations that arise from payments received by pharmacies and competition among pharmacies, as well as insurers, over a three-year period. To gauge the extent to which pharmacy concentration a¤ects prices in the retail prescription drug market, I construct three competition measures.
First, I examine the distance e¤ects of up to the …fth nearest pharmacy on drug pricing (Gravelle et al., 2016) . Second, I construct two sets of distance variables, one to rival pharmacies and the other to one's same-chain pharmacies, and explore possible businessstealing and cannibalization e¤ects, respectively (Davis, 2006) . Third, I compute the socalled "Fixed-Travel-Time Her…ndahl-Hirschman index"(FTHHI), which incorporates both the distance and travel time to competing pharmacies in the same area Shapiro, 2014, 2018) .
After controlling for drug and pharmacy characteristics, locality, year, month, drug class, and manufacturer …xed e¤ects, I …nd that pharmacies receive lower payments in more concentrated buyer (insurer) markets, but higher payments in more concentrated seller (pharmacy) markets. The latter e¤ect is more pronounced if nearby competitors belong to the same national pharmacy chain. Moreover, I …nd considerable business-stealing e¤ects from nearby rivals, but little evidence of cannibalization e¤ects from one's own establishments. These …ndings are robust to various controls and model speci…cations. Next, I perform additional analyses, and conclude that the distance e¤ects among competing pharmacies di¤er across di¤erent drug types and area types. Speci…cally, the distance e¤ect is more noticeable among prescription drugs that consumers are less likely to price search, or among pharmacies located in relatively a-uent areas or counties that do not border another state.
Related Literature
This paper is related to previous studies on health providers (e.g., physicians and hospitals), which conclude that higher market concentration leads to higher negotiated service prices Focusing on Medicare bene…ciaries, Kessler and McClellan (2000) examine hospital com-petition by introducing a novel and "relatively exogenous" measure-the travel distance between patients and hospitals-and they …nd improved social welfare in the 1990s due to increased competition through HMO enrollment. Building on Kessler and McClellan's (2000) work, Dunn and Shapiro (2018) develop a travel-time-based concentration measure and study the relationship between physician concentration and service provision; they focus on cardiologists and measure service provision through both quantity and type of procedure. They
show that in more concentrated areas, cardiologists perform more procedures. Gravelle et al.
(2016) examine the e¤ects of competition in the market for physician consultations, using a unique Australian data set. They …rst extend the Vickrey-Salop model to consider both quality and price decisions, and then test their theoretical predictions. Their two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation concludes that higher insurer concentration leads to higher premiums, and thus lower market coverage. This is one of the …rst studies to investigate market power from the seller's (insurers') perspective. In this study, I consider market power on both seller (i.e., pharmacies) and buyer (i.e., insurers) sides of the prescription drug market. In this aspect, my analysis is complementary to that of Bates et al. (2012) . Furthermore, similar to Bates et al., I use lagged HHI to measure insurer concentration to alleviate the potential endogeneity concern.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief discussion of the pharmaceutical industry is given in Section 2, and Section 3 introduces the data sources and sample selection process. Section 4 presents the model and discusses the main …ndings, and additional analyses are described in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
The Pharmaceutical Industry
In this section, I provide an overview of the pharmaceutical industry and discuss the roles of various stakeholders (e.g., manufacturers, retailers, consumers) and their potential e¤ects on competition along the supply chain.
The U.S. prescription drug pricing system is notoriously complicated, due mainly to lack of transparency and competition. Market transactions usually involve payments, discounts, and rebates within a vast network of manufacturers, wholesalers, PBMs, retail and non-retail pharmacies, insurers, and patients (and their employers). Among these, PBMs "manage pharmacy bene…ts on behalf of their clients, which include health plans, HMOs, and selfinsured employer-based plans"(CBO, 2007). and retail and non-retail pharmacies, before any discounts would apply. In short, the price paid at any stage of the supply chain depends on market competition, along with the buyer's bargaining power, which hinges on a number of factors; these include purchase volume and whether the buyer is able to substitute among competing alternatives.
Consider, in turn, pricing strategies for di¤erent types of drugs: single-and multiplesource brand-name drugs and generic drugs. First, under patent protection, manufacturers leverage their market power to charge high prices for single-source drugs, but do o¤er rebates 7 The U.S. prescription drug insurance market is typically managed by PBMs, with the top three players (Express Scripts, Caremark/CVS, and United Health/OptumRx) accounting for more than 70% of the market share as of 2017. Source: "Cigna-Express Scripts: Vertical Integration and PBMs'Medical-Pharmacy Future (rerun)," by Adam J. Fein, May 02, 2018 (https://www.drugchannels.net/2018/05/cigna-expressscripts-vertical.html). 8 to incentivize more sales. Non-retail or mail-order pharmacies, rather than retail pharmacies (independent, chain store, and superstore), often receive such discounts, because they are more ‡exible in terms of favoring one brand name over another (CBO, 2007) . Similarly, manufacturers o¤er rebates to PBMs in exchange for preferential treatment for their drugs through, for example, a lower copayment than would be the case for therapeutic equivalents (i.e., close substitutes). 9 The mechanism used to steer patient demand is known as a formulary, which is a list of drugs covered under an insurance plan. 10 Second, for multi-source drugs, retail pharmacies typically dominate the negotiation, as several manufacturers compete with each other once a patent expires. In this case, retail pharmacies are able to obtain discounted prices from manufacturers, because they not only decide whether to dispense a brand-name or generic version, but also which manufacturer to buy from.
Finally, with generic drugs, most industry players-including retail and non-retail pharmacies, wholesalers, and mail-order pharmacies-can choose which versions to dispense, and are thus able to obtain discounts from manufacturers. 11 Among them, large chain pharmacies, in particular, can take advantage of their large purchase volumes for better prices than small-scale purchasers can o¤er.
Taken together, Berndt (2002) summarizes the general pricing pattern across di¤erent buying groups as follows: The Department of Veteran A¤airs and the Department of Defense usually have the lowest prescription drug prices, 12 followed by hospitals for inpatient prescription use only and sta¤-model HMOs. Institutions such as HMOs have the second highest prices, and retail pharmacies typically receive the lowest discount from manufactur- 9 However, information on the size of such discounts and rebates, as well as the identities of those receiving them, is typically not disclosed. 10 Depending on the type, a closed formulary has a limited list of medications, and an open formulary allows access to all medications but at di¤erent levels of copayments or other conditions. 11 PBMs, unless associated with mail-order pharmacies, have no ability to choose which generic version of a drug, and usually do not receive such discounts from manufacturers. 12 Note that by law, drug manufacturers are required to o¤er government programs substantial discounts (e.g., up to 24% to the VA) o¤ the average price paid by nonfederal purchasers, which has e¤ectively raised prices for the latter group (Scott Morton, 1997; Scott Morton and Duggan, 2006) . ers. These patterns, coupled with declining dispensing fees and the rising bargaining power of insurers with large enrollment increases (e.g., Medicare Part D participants), have led to decreasing pharmacies'gross margins in recent years (Berndt and Newhouse, 2012) . 13 According to the CMS, the U.S. spent $328.6 billion in the retail prescription drug market in 2016. 14 The federal government paid 43% of the total (29% through Medicare, 10%
through Medicaid, and 4% through other federal and state programs such as the Veteran's Administration (VA) and Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP)), private insurance paid another 43%, and the remaining consisted of out-of-pocket payments by consumers. 15 Two factors determine the price paid by the patient: whether the drug is on the drug plan's formulary and its tier. Depending on the negotiation between the insurer (or its PBM) and the manufacturer, a prescription drug is divided into a three-or four-tier system. 16 Under drug bene…t cost-sharing provisions, the insurer (or its PBM) is responsible for the di¤erence between the patient's payment and the rate negotiated with the manufacturer (Berndt and Newhouse, 2012). Using pharmacy claims, this paper studies how competition, from both pharmacies and insurers, a¤ects overall patient and insurer (or its PBM) payments.
Data
For the analysis, a unique sample is assembled from the New Hampshire Comprehensive
Healthcare Information System's (NHCHIS) "limited use"commercial pharmacy claims data with a service date between 2009 and 2011. State laws in NH require that all health insurance companies and health maintenance organizations licensed in the state submit premiums billed 13 For example, Lakdawalla and Yin (2009) show that the implementation of Medicare Part D has led to lower drug prices and pharmacy pro…t, by 2.5% and 5%, respectively, for each additional 100,000 enrollees of an insurer.
14 Source: "National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights" (https://www.cms.gov/Research-StatisticsData-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/highlights.pdf). 15 Source: "What are the recent and forecasted trends in prescription drug spending?"By Rabah Kamal and Cynthia Cox, Kaiser Family Foundation, December 20, 2017 (https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/chartcollection/recent-forecasted-trends-prescription-drug-spending/#item-start). 16 Generally, generic drugs are typically on the …rst tier and cheapest for the patient, preferred brand-name drugs are on the second tier, other brand names are on the third tier, and specialty and other very expensive drugs are on the four tier, for which the patient pays the highest copayment or coinsurance amount. and claims posted during the previous calender year by July 18 All observations with cost exceeding chg are also dropped, for where cost is the list price of a dispensed drug to a pharmacy and chg is the total charge a dispensed prescription drug. 19 Entry corrections also include, among others, standardizing the spelling of locality names and the format of ZIP codes. 20 For the purpose of this study, I have restricted the data to the most commonly prescribed quantities, and removed National Drug Codes (NDCs) with fewer than 100 prescriptions. This selection process yields the 200 most prescribed drugs (refer to Appendix 17 The NHCHIS website (www.nhchis.org) provides a detailed code book for all variables in each data set. 18 These extreme values are de…ned as observations with a log price (lnchg) more than three standard deviations from the mean. 19 Note that information such as chargebacks, rebates, and discounts o¤ered by manufacturers is not explicitly indicated in this data set. This is not surprising, as such information typically remains con…dential.
One might interpret these observations as cases in which a negotiated price is lower than the list price, due to undisclosed rebates that pharmacies might have received. When including these observations, all estimation results remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same. In addition, I compare possible e¤ects of rebates on patient payment alone, both with and without these observations, and the mean out-of-pocket expenses are again very similar. These results are available upon request. 20 While the original NHCHIS data refer to the location of a pharmacy as "city," I choose to use the term "locality" to re ‡ect the fact that NH has large rural areas that are outside city limits.
identi…ed by a unique pharmacy record ID number that is used to link to the pharmacy's claims data. 21 Closer investigation of this raw data …le reveals that the same pharmacy may have multiple entries.
Due to entry inconsistencies/errors and missing information in various …elds, I took several steps to clean the pharmacy data. First, I assembled a sample of NH pharmacies by …ltering those included in the pharmacy claims data during 2009-2011. Second, to identify a unique pharmacy, I used the reported national pharmacy ID number. When such information is unavailable, I relied on the combination of pharmacy name, locality, and ZIP code for identi…cation purposes. This step narrows the total number of pharmacies to 2,459.
Third, I further identi…ed 376 unique pharmacies by manually removing repetitive entries with slightly di¤erent pharmacy names. 22 The last step is to locate the physical address of each identi…ed pharmacy, mainly through Google searches and publicly available o¢ cial government documents. 23 Eventually, exact addresses for 345 pharmacies were recovered. 24 
Model
In this section, I examine the e¤ects of pharmacy competition using the following model: 23 The New Hampshire State Board of Pharmacy published a list of 305 pharmacies on its website (Source: www.nh.gov/pharmacy/). 24 One may attribute the missing information on the remaining 31 pharmacies to, among other factors, possible changes in market structure, as data collection was performed after the sample period.
The dependent variable, ln(unit price) ijkmpy , is the logarithm of unit price paid by patient p and her insurance for prescription drug i sold at pharmacy k in locality j in month m of year y; it is the overall patient and insurer payments divided by the number of metric units of medication dispensed.
The key variable of interest is lndistance k , which is de…ned as the logarithm of the distance to a nearby pharmacy. For robustness reasons, I include …ve measures, from the nearest to the …fth nearest pharmacy. Figure 2 plots all the pharmacies in the sample, with darker colors indicating more concentrated pharmacy locations; these coincide with large metropolitan areas. Market concentration for insurers, ln HHI_ins jmy , is an insurer HHI based on market share in locality j during month m of year y. Refer to Appendix A for the de…nition of these and other variables used in the analysis.
In addition, I include a set of dummy variables (pharmtype k ) to account for di¤erences in pharmacy type that would a¤ect retail pricing decisions. Furthermore, Equation (1) controls for a set of dummy variables (instype jk ) that indicate di¤erences in leverage among insurers when negotiating payments with pharmacies or their representatives. Equation
(1) also includes prescription drug-level variables: ln(unit cost) ijkmy and dummy variables, brand1 imy and brand2 imy , indicate whether or not a prescription drug i is a brand-name drug facing generic competition, respectively, in month m of year y, with generics as the reference group (Sorensen, 2000) . Finally, I control for locality, year, month, drug class, and manufacturer …xed e¤ects in equation (1). " ijmy is the error term. I report clustered robust standard errors in the estimation, allowing potential intercorrelation between prescription drugs within the same drug class. 
Identi…cation Concerns
If equation (1) has omitted variables that determine prices and are correlated with the concentration measures, it could lead to biased estimates. My analysis addresses this potential endogeneity concern in several ways.
First, to account for the potential endogeneity of the concentration measures, I include market-level (e.g., locality) …xed e¤ects to control for all observed and unobserved market characteristics that may a¤ect pharmacy pricing and/or location decisions in the regression estimation.
Second, for pharmacy concentration measures, rather than using market-level measures, such as the number of pharmacies, I use a distance measure that gauges the geographic distance to nearby rivals. This measure is frequently used in the growing literature on the e¤ects of competition in the healthcare industry (Gravelle et al., 2016) . Furthermore, I adopt a novel concentration measure that incorporates both distance and travel time of patients to available pharmacies in the area, or the so-called …xed-travel-time HHI (F T HHI) (Dunn and Shapiro, 2014; 2018) . 26 The advantage of using this concentration measure lies in the fact that it is derived from theoretically predicted market shares, and thus is more immune to the usual endogeneity concerns about conventional concentration measures, which are largely based on actual market shares.
Similarly, an insurer's entry decision may be correlated with other unobserved market characteristics that might a¤ect a pharmacy's pricing decisions. To evaluate this possibility, one may divide such unobserved characteristics into time-invariant and time-varying components. Given the relatively short time span of the sample period (three years), any time-varying characteristics may not change signi…cantly. In addition, a set of year and month dummies is used to control for time trends in the sample. To account for possible (residual) endogeneity, I instrument ln HHI_ins jmy with a lagged value of itself to remove any simultaneity bias caused by potential correlation between HHI_ins jmy and the un- 26 Refer to Appendix B of a discussion on the construction of FTHHI measures.
observable " ijmy . Since this variable is predetermined, one may be less concerned about potential bias in the estimation results (Bates et al., 2012) .
Finally, I employ panel data techniques to address, at least to some degree, the potential endogeneity of market structure through both random e¤ects and Mundlak (1978) models (Gravelle et al., 2016) . In Table 2 , I report the annual means of the three types of concentration measures, which demonstrate considerable over-time variation in the sample.
Speci…cally, over the three-year period, the sample shows an increasing concentration in the retail pharmacy market, as the mean distance to nearby pharmacies steadily increases, and so do the FTHHI measures. These observations are in line with the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions within the retail pharmacy industry. 27 In short, both dimensions of data variations, cross-sectional and over time, help identify estimates for the key variables of interest, the concentration measures. Table 3 reports estimation results for equation (1), where each column uses a di¤erent distance measure. Distance to the three closest pharmacies is expected to a¤ect one's pricing decisions (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991) , and the other two are included as robustness checks (Gravelle et al., 2016) . All coe¢ cients for 2 are positive, ranging from 0.033 to 0.057, and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. That is, the farther away a competitor is located, the higher the price a pharmacy would charge for these most-prescribed medications. As expected, the estimates for ln HHI_ins jm;y 1 are negative and statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. That is, as the insurer market becomes more concentrated, it lowers the average payment a pharmacy receives.
Discussion
Turning to other coe¢ cients, as the unit cost rises, so does the average drug price. Compared to generics, average prices for branded drugs are higher, regardless of the presence of 27 Source: "Pharmacy Wars: An Era of Acquisition, Mergers, and Losses," by Timothy Aungst, Pharmacy Times, March 6, 2018 (https://www.pharmacytimes.com/contributor/timothy-aungstpharmd/2018/03/pharmacy-wars-an-era-of-acquisition-mergers-and-losses). generic competition. Moreover, di¤erent insurance plans would a¤ect prices as well. Compared to those with indemnity (the reference category), patients with other plans, except for Medicare Part A and HMO, would pay a higher average price. Furthermore, independent pharmacies tend to obtain lower payments than other types, ceteris paribus.
To examine the possible branding e¤ect, Table 4 adds a variable in each model speci…-cation to indicate whether a nearby pharmacy (from the nearest to the …fth nearest, respectively) belongs to the same national store chain. 28 The coe¢ cients for samechain x nearest are positive and statistically signi…cant (except for column 5), which con…rms the branding e¤ect among retail pharmacies in close proximity. This is consistent with the expectation that pharmacies in the same chain that are located nearby would choose to soften price competition. For example, ceteris paribus, if a pharmacy's closest competitor geographically is in the same national chain, its average price is 13.7% higher than if the nearest pharmacy belongs to a di¤erent chain. Such a branding e¤ect declines when a same-chain pharmacy is located farther away, as is evident from the estimates for samechain x nearest in the next four columns. All other estimates remain qualitatively the same as in Table 3 , but are not reported for brevity.
As a robustness check, I report panel estimation results for the distance e¤ects in Table   5 and for the branding e¤ects in Appendix Tables 3 and 4 . Thus, I conclude that the distance e¤ects, as well as the branding e¤ects, are robust to various controls and model speci…cations.
Business-stealing and Cannibalization E¤ects
To further investigate the distance e¤ects across di¤erent types of nearby establishments, I
follow Davis (2006) to include two sets of distance variables, one for rivals (lndistancerivalx k ) and the other for one's same-chain stores (lndistanceownx k ), in equation (1) . 29 Note that unlike cinemas, a considerable number of pharmacies (e.g., non-retail and some independent pharmacies) do not have multiple locations. For the purposes of this analysis, I only use retail pharmacies for these estimations, as in Table 4 . 30 As indicated in Table 6 , while my sample shows the market-stealing e¤ect-as rival pharmacies move farther away, prices increasethere seems to be little evidence of the cannibalization e¤ect: Instead, as a pharmacy's own establishment locates farther away, it leads to higher prices.
Furthermore, a closer look at the data shows that the average distance to nearby rival pharmacies is much shorter than that to one's same-chain pharmacies (see Appendix Table A.4). For example, the average distance to the …fth nearest rival is 1.771 miles, compared to 12.437 miles to the nearest same-chain pharmacy. Based on this observation, one might 29 Stata user-written command, geodist, is used to construct these distance variables (Picard, 2010) . 30 All estimates remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same when only chain stores and supermarket pharmacies are included. These results are available upon request.
argue that competition from rival pharmacies is mostly localized. These results provide some evidence that pharmacies tend to cluster around their rivals, rather than their own establishments, an observation that is consistent with Davis (2006) . 31 
An Alternative Distance Measure
Using an alternative objective measure of competition among pharmacies, I replace distance k with …xed-travel-time HHI (F T HHI) in equation (1), under the assumption that a patient's maximal driving time is …xed within a market boundary Shapiro, 2014, 2018 ).
The advantage of using this concentration measure is that it is derived from theoretically predicted market shares, and thus is more immune to the usual endogeneity concerns about conventional concentration measures, which are largely based on actual market shares (Dunn and Shapiro, 2018).
In Table 7 , F T HHI assigns the same (i.e., unweighted) probability of a patient's visiting all pharmacies within a 20-, 30-, 40-, 50-or 60-minute driving radius in columns (1) through (5), respectively, and assigns a higher (i.e., weighted) probability to one located closer to the patient than another located farther away within a 20-, 30-, 40-, 50-or 60-minute driving radius in columns (6) through (10), respectively. 32 Focusing on estimates for the two competition measures, I show that as the pharmacy market becomes more concentrated-as measured by an objective method, F T HHI-the average price rises; this e¤ect is statistically significant, except for column (6) . In addition, estimates for ln HHI_ins jm;y 1 remain negative and statistically signi…cant in Table 7 . Taking column (1) as an example, a 10% increase in pharmacy concentration leads to a 0.15% increase in the average prescription payment, but a 10% increase in insurer concentration causes a 0.81% decrease in prices. Compared to 31 Note that Davis (2006) is interested in the e¤ects of entry/exit on revenues in the motion theater market, while my analysis focuses on the distance e¤ects on pharmacy pricing. 32 The use of county …xed e¤ects in Table 7 controls for observed and unobserved county-speci…c factors, and also captures the fact that pharmacies may engage in di¤erent competitive strategies in neighboring counties (Dunn and Shapiro, 2014) . As an alternative model speci…cation, I also estimate equation (1) using locality …xed e¤ects and obtain similiar coe¢ cients on F T HHI variables. These results are available upon request. Dunn and Shapiro (2014) , overall price e¤ects are smaller in my pharmacy sample than their samples of cardiologists and orthopedists, 33 but the relative magnitudes between providers (i.e., physicians in their study vs. pharmacies in mine) and insurance carriers are similar.
Taken together, ceteris paribus, if a new pharmacy enters a market, it would intensify the competition, at least locally, and lead to lower prices. In addition, depending on whether the new entrant is a rival establishment or one's own, one may expect di¤erent e¤ects. In contrast, if two pharmacies merge, it would soften the competition, which would in turn increase prices. Naturally, one would then be interested in the magnitudes of such price changes, and whether these e¤ects are greater in more concentrated markets. A full appraisal of such economic e¤ects is beyond the scope of this paper, but is an interesting topic for future research. In a simple counterfactural analysis, in which I compare "monopoly" and "competitive"prices with "current"prices, models using FTHHI measures tend to generate lower prices than models using distance measures. 34 
Heterogeneous E¤ects across Products and Areas
In this section, I investigate heterogeneity in the distance e¤ects by drug types and by areas with di¤erent economic/geographic conditions. Given the robustness of the results shown in the previous section, I use the same RE models as in Table 5 for the analyses in this section.
35
One may wonder whether pharmacies adopt di¤erent pricing strategies across drug types.
For example, Sorensen (2000) argues that purchase frequency matters in consumer search; search for better prices becomes more intensive for drugs that require regular re…lls. To ex- 33 The di¤erence might, in part, be attributable to the fact that my sample only involves a single state, while Dunn and Shapiro (2014)'s include the entire U.S. 34 Speci…cally, I set the distance to rivals to be either zero (the "competitive" case) or the entire width of NH (the "monopoly" case), and current prices are computed at the means of the sample. These results are available upon request. 35 These results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar when using the …xed e¤ect models, as in Table 3 , and are available upon request. amine any potential di¤erentials, I divide the 165 top-selling drugs into two groups, acute and chronic medications, 36 and report the main results in Table 8 . Comparing estimates across the two groups, one notices smaller magnitudes for the distance variables among chronic drugs (the last two columns) than acute drugs (the …rst two columns), which o¤ers some evidence of enhanced competition among pharmacies that sell drugs for chronic conditions.
In columns (1) and (3), we observe a declining e¤ect on a pharmacy's prices from the nearest to the …fth nearest rivals. A similar conclusion holds when we focus on all retail pharmacies; in addition, the positive estimates for samex (x = 1; 2; 3; 4 or 5) indicate a robust branding e¤ect in columns (2) and (4).
Previous studies on prescription drugs (Chen, 2015) suggest that price-sensitive consumers (e.g., the elderly) are more likely to search for better deals. To test di¤erent pricing strategies on prescriptions mainly used by the elderly (65+) and by younger patients, I divide the sample in two by the average age of patients. Results are reported in Table 9 . The distance e¤ect is more pronounced for medications commonly prescribed for the younger population (column 1) than those for seniors (column 3). This is consistent with our expectation that the elderly are more likely to engage in price search-which may lead to a smaller distance e¤ect among pharmacies that carry such medications-due to more intense competition for potential buyers. Both columns (2) and (4) report noticeable branding e¤ects, as in Table 4 .
The next set of analyses compares areas with di¤erent economic/geographic conditions.
Pharmacies' operating costs, such as wages, facility maintenance, and license fees and liability insurance, may vary depending on geographical location and local market conditions (Furberg et al., 2009 ). The underlying assumption is that pharmacies located in more af‡uent (or dense urban) areas may adopt a di¤erent pricing strategy from those in relatively 36 The following drug classes are categorized as acute medications: antibiotics, analgesics, adrenergic agonists, anxiolytics, corticosteroids, diuretics, anticoagulants, and antiinfectives, while the following are chronic medications: antidepressants, angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors, contraceptives, antiadrenergics, antihyperlipidemics, antidiabetic agents, and angiotensin II receptor antagonists. The remaining 35 drugs in the sample can be sorted to either category, and thus are not used in this analysis. Refer to Appendix Table A.1 for more information. disadvantaged (or rural) areas. In a series of tables, I then divide the sample by median home value (Table 10 ) and median poverty rate (Table 11 ). In the same vein, I further divide the sample by whether a locality belongs to Census-de…ned metropolitan areas (Table   12 ), or the Census-de…ned …ve largest cities in NH (Table 13) . Finally, since New Hampshire shares a border with three states (Massachusetts, Vermont, and Maine) and one Canadian province (Quebec), one might expect at least some cross-border competition. 37 To examine the potential impact, I divide the sample by whether a county borders another state (Table   14) .
Taken together the estimation results from these analyses, I …nd a larger distance e¤ect in wealthier neighborhoods-those with higher home values (the …rst two columns of Table   10 ) or lower poverty rates (the …rst two columns of Table 11 )-than in less wealthy areas (the last two columns in each table). Similarly, I …nd a more pronounced distance e¤ect among pharmacies in metropolitan areas (i.e., the counties of Rockingham, Stra¤ord, and Hillsborough) in the …rst two columns of Table 12 , or those located in the largest cities in NH (i.e., Manchester, Nashua, Concord, Derry, and Rochester) in the …rst two columns of Table 13 , than in less-populated areas. These …ndings are consistent with the expectation that operation costs (e.g., real estate and labor), along with other factors, may be higher in some neighborhoods than others.
Furthermore, the distance e¤ects are more pronounced in the …rst row of Table 14 , which indicates that pharmacies in Belknap and Merrimack, which do not border another state, would face less cross-border competition than those located elsewhere. The same pattern largely holds in the last three rows, in which the counties are grouped by the state they border: respectively, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Maine. The distance e¤ects are the smallest in counties that border Vermont, which provides some evidence of Vermont's more aggressive legislative steps toward lowering prescription drug costs than the rest of the region. 38 Although raw claims data show that actual cross-border purchases during the sample period were rather limited, 39 one might still expect to observe the competition exerted by rivals across the state border.
Both price-discrimination and product-di¤erentiation theories o¤er some explanations for the observed di¤erential e¤ects between areas with di¤erent economic/geographic conditions. 40 For example, one might relate these …ndings to the fact that pharmacies may engage in less …erce price competition in more a-uent regions-taking advantage of a relatively larger proportion of potential consumers facing higher search costs-than in less wealthy areas. In addition, although prescription drugs are homogeneous across pharmacies, the associated purchase experience can vary in terms of service-related characteristics such as pharmacist expertise and quality interactions. Thus, we expect product di¤erentiation to play a role in consumer search, and also that wealthier consumers may be more willing to pay a premium for better services (Wolinsky, 1986 ; Anderson and Renault, 1999). Furthermore, wealthier individuals may simply have less elastic demand or risk preferences, which can serve as additional explanation for the observed disparity in the distance e¤ects across areas in the sample.
In summary, I show heterogeneous e¤ects of the distance e¤ect by drug type and by areas in the sample, which is also consistent with predictions from the theoretical literature on search and product di¤erentiation. 39 Raw data suggest a small number of prescriptions …lled in these neighboring states-speci…cally, 4% in Massachusetts and about 1% in Vermont and Maine annually during the sample period. 40 One might speculate that economies of scale play a role in pharmacy pricing. Thus, I divide the sample by pharmacy size, which is proxied by the number of total prescriptions …lled in raw claims data. As indicated in Appendix Table A.5, estimates for the variables of interest are greater with larger pharmacies than smaller ones (except for column (1)), suggesting that pharmacies facing the most competition are also likely to have the most density, as well as the highest sales volume. As rivals move farther away, these pharmacies would likely gain more from softened competition (i.e., a greater distance e¤ect) than smaller pharmacies.
Conclusion
Using pharmacy claims …led in New Hampshire between 2009 and 2011, I study the extent to which pharmacy competition a¤ects retail prescription drug prices. I measure competition among pharmacies by the distance to nearby pharmacies (Gravelle et al., 2016), including those that belong to one's own chain (Davis, 2006) , and a concentration measure that accounts for both the distance and travel time to competing pharmacies in the area, or the "Fixed-Travel-Time Her…ndahl-Hirschman Index" Shapiro, 2014, 2018) . After controlling for pharmacy and area characteristics, I …nd that distance to nearby competitors positively a¤ects pharmacy pricing, and the e¤ect is more pronounced if they belong to the same national chain. These results are robust to various competition measures and model speci…cations. In addition, greater insurer concentration leads to lower average payments to pharmacies for medications. Furthermore, my analysis shows di¤erential distance e¤ects across drug types and areas with varying economic/geographic conditions, which indicates that pharmacies engage in more …erce price competition when selling prescription drugs associated with more intense consumer search, in less a-uent areas, or in regions facing cross-border competition. Methodologically, this paper advances the empirical literature on competition measures by adding new evidence from the retail pharmaceutical market. Finally, the conclusions from this paper can be extended beyond the State of NH, owing to the comprehensiveness of the data used in the analysis. 41 Nevertheless, future research on this topic could focus on new data sources that cover more diverse geographic areas, and may link patient-level medical claims to pharmacy claims to examine how competition a¤ects individuals'health outcomes as a whole. Such research would help us better understand the implications of multifaceted provider competition in the healthcare market.
Ever-rising prescription expenditures have imposed a substantial …nancial burden on consumers; this includes the insured, who shoulder an increasingly larger share of the expenses. 41 Although as a state, NH might be di¤erent from other states in the U.S., my sample includes all pharmacies operating in NH, in both metropolitan and rural areas, which may be representative of similar areas elsewhere in the country.
For instance, high-deductible health insurance plans have become increasingly common in recent years. Moreover, PBMs have changed their prescription coverages, and shifted a higher share of the cost to consumers. For example, certain medications may no longer be covered, and others may be moved to more expensive tiers that render consumers responsible for a higher copay or coinsurance. 42 44 Given the complexity of the issues, a successful reform would require a new pricing system that o¤ers fair prices and also provides su¢ cient incentives for pharmaceutical companies to continue valuable research and development, especially for speciality drugs.
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Appendix A: Variable De…nitions
Competition measures -lndistance k : logarithm of the distance from pharmacy k to a nearby pharmacy.
In particular, I include …ve measures in the analysis, from the nearest to the …fth nearest pharmacy, or ln(distance to nearest), ln(distance to 2 nd nearest), 42 Source: "Americans Say They Are Su¤ering as Drug Costs Continue to Rise,"by Ginger Skinner, December 14, 2017 (https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/americans-say-they-are-su¤ering-as-drug-costscontinue-to-rise/). 43 ln(distance to 3 rd nearest), ln(distance to 4 th nearest), and ln(distance to 5 th nearest), respectively.
-samechain x nearest: dummy variable indicating whether a nearby pharmacy (from the nearest to the …fth nearest, respectively) belongs to the same national store chain (x = 1; 2; 3; 4 or 5).
- -lndistancerivalx k : distance from pharmacy k to the x th nearest rival establishment. Speci…cally, I include …ve measures in the analysis, from the nearest to the …fth nearest rival pharmacy, or ln(distancerival1 ), ln(distancerival1 ), ln(distancerival3 ), ln(distancerival4 ), and ln(distancerival5 ), respectively.
-lndistanceownlx k : distance from pharmacy k to the x th nearest one's own establishment. Speci…cally, I include …ve measures in the analysis, from the nearest to the …fth nearest same-brand pharmacy, or ln(distanceown1 ), ln(distanceown1 ), ln(distanceown3 ), ln(distanceown4 ), and ln(distanceown5 ), respectively. , where tpay is all insurer payments, copay is copay amount, coins is coinsurance amount, ded is deductible amount, and qty is the total unit dosage. Negative values are removed.
-ln(unit cost): logarithm of the unit cost to pharmacy k for a prescription drug -brand w/ generic: dummy variable indicating whether a prescription drug i is a brand-name drug facing generic competition in month m of year y, with generics as the reference group (Sorensen, 2000) .
-brand w=o generic: dummy variable indicating whether a prescription drug i is a brand-name drug facing no generic competition in month m of year y, with generics as the reference group (Sorensen, 2000) .
-chg: gross amount due (total charges) for the service, as reported by a pharmacy.
Insurer types 48 47 The following variables are retrieved from the pharmacy claims data set (PHARMACY_DETAIL_yyyy), which contains one record for each …lled script and is organized by service year (Source: The NH CHIS Warehouse Data Directory -Limited-Use Data Set, Version 2.3 by the O¢ ce of Medicaid Business and Policy, NH DHHS, December 2011.) 48 The following variables are retrieved from the pharmacy claims data set (PHAR--EP O: dummy variable indicating whether patient's health plan is an Exclusive Provider Organization.
-HM O: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is a Health Maintenance Organization.
-HM O medicare risk: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Medicare Risk.
-P P O: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is a Preferred
Provider Organization.
-P OS: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is a Point of Service.
-indemnity: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is an
Indemnity. This is used as a reference group.
-medicare part A: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is an Medicare Part A.
-medicare part D: dummy variable indicating whether the patient's health plan is an Medicare Part D.
pharmacy types -independent k : dummy variable indicating whether pharmacy k is an independent pharmacy.
-chainstore k : dummy variable indicating whether pharmacy k belongs to a large chain.
-supermarket k : dummy variable indicating whether pharmacy k is located within a supermarket. -lnmedhomeval: logarithm of median home value in a given county in year y.
-percent black: percent Black/African American population in a given county in year y.
-percent asian: percent Asian population in a given county in year y.
-percent hispanic: percent Hispanic/Latino population in a given county in year y.
-unemployment rate: unemployment rate in a given county in year y.
Appendix B: Construction of FTHHI
The construction of FTHHI variables closely is heavily borrowed from Shapiro (2014, 2018) . Speci…cally, I construct the competition measure, F T HHI, in four steps.
First, I de…ne a geographic market boundary. Second, I calculate the probability that a patient would visit a nearby pharmacy within the market boundary de…ned in the …rst step.
Third, I compute the expected market share of each pharmacy, based on the probabilities derived from the previous step. Finally, I aggregate expected yearly market shares at the county level, and merge with the pharmacy claims data. Probability weighting schemes To compute the probability of a patient's visiting a pharmacy, I consider two scenarios: (1) the patient is equally likely to …ll her prescription in all pharmacies located within a given market boundary, and (2) the patient is more likely to …ll her prescription at a pharmacy closer to her location than ones that are farther away.
Under the …rst scenario, for each latitude and longitude coordinate in a NH county, I
count the total number of pharmacies (totcount) within a maximum radial distance with _ kminute driving time. Thus, the probability of the patient's visiting any of these pharmacies is 1 totcount . Accordingly, all pharmacies within the radius are assigned the same probability.
Under the second scenario, consider a standard Hotelling model in which the patient's idiosyncratic preferences lie along the uniform distribution between 0 and _ k, and k x i is proportional to travel costs. The patient would …ll her prescription at a pharmacy located at x i , rather than one located at x 0 if V k x i + " i0 > V k, where V denotes the valuation the patient receives from the prescription and " i0 her preference of traveling from x i to x 0 .
By construction, k x 0 = 0, and the patient located at x 0 is willing to travel to x i (i.e., driving k x i minutes) with probability:
51 Source: 2010 Census Gazetteer Files for all ZIP Code Tabulation Areas (ZCTAs) (http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/gazetteer2010.html). 52 To match coordinates between tract-level and Zip code-level, I use the 2010 ZCTA to Census Tract Relationship File downloaded from (http://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/zcta_rel_download.html).
Expected market share The probability of the patient located at x 0 choosing a pharmacy at x i is treated as the total number of patients from x 0 to purchase from this speci…c pharmacy. That is, the expected market share of the pharmacy located at x i for patients located at Census-tract centroid x 0 is
where j refers to each pharmacy in the sample. As a result, pharmacies that are located farther from x 0 are viewed as weaker rivals, as they are assigned a lower weight than those located closer to x 0 . Expected market shares are calculated for each value of _ k under both scenarios (unweighted and weighted probabilities).
The FTHHI concentration measures First, I compute an HHI at each Census-tract coordinate, based on the expected market shares at location h, or HHI(
I then aggregate these at the county level as the weighted sum of these HHI( Table 3 , but not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Note: All model specifications include year, month, drug class, and manufacturer fixed effects, and columns (6) through (10) also include the locality-level means of the distance measure and pharmacy characteristics, but not reported; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 3 , along with county, year, month, drug class, and manufacturer fixed effects, but not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 8 . The distance/branding effects on retail drug prices (medications for acute vs. chronic conditions) Note: The estimates are reported in a condensed version. Specifically, estimates in row n (n=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) of columns (1)&(3) are obtained from using the same model specification as in column (n) of Table 5 , and each pair of estimates in rows n and n+5 of columns (2)&(4) is obtained using the same model specifications as in column (n) of (1)& (3) are obtained using the same model specification as in column (n) of Table 5 , and each pair of estimates in rows n and n+5 of columns (2)& (4) is obtained using the same model specifications as in column (n) of (1)& (3) are obtained using the same model specification as in column (n) of Table 5 , and each pair of estimates in rows n and n+5 of columns (2)& (4) is obtained using the same model specifications as in column (n) of Table A.3. All control variables are not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (1)& (3) are obtained using the same model specification as in column (n) of Table 5 , and each pair of estimates in rows n and n+5 of columns (2)&(4) is obtained using the same model specifications as in column (n) of Table A.3. All control variables are not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 The estimates are reported in a condensed version. Specifically, estimates in row n (n=1, 2, 3, 4, 5) of columns (1)&(3) are obtained using the same model specification as in column (n) of Table 5 , and each pair of estimates in rows n and n+5 of columns (2)&(4) is obtained using the same model specifications as in column (n) of Table A.3. All control variables are not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 5 , and each pair of estimates in rows n and n+5 of columns (2)& (4) is obtained using the same model specifications as in column (n) of Table A.3. All control variables are not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 4 , but not reported for brevity; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by drug class; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
